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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the law of punitive damages in Minnesota changed 
dramatically.  For nearly twenty years prior to that time, there had 
been a significant limitation on the ability of a plaintiff to recover 
punitive damages under Minnesota law: personal injury was always 
required.  This meant that even if a plaintiff could establish that 
the defendant acted maliciously, intentionally, or with deliberate 
disregard for its property rights, the plaintiff was limited to the 
recovery of compensatory damages.  This limitation on punitive 
damages was both significant and unique: although some states 
impose caps on punitive damages or bar them entirely, no state 
other than Minnesota had abolished punitive damages for injury to 
property while allowing punitive damages for personal injury.  In 
March 2001, all that changed.  In Jensen v. Walsh,1 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court explicitly limited its earlier decisions in Eisert v. 
Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.2 and Independent School District No. 
622 v. Keene Corp.,3 which had declined to allow punitive damages 
claims in the absence of personal injury.  In so doing, the court
† Partner, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  J.D. 1992, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; B.A. 1988, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan; law clerk to Hon. Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court 
Western District of Wisconsin, 1992-93.  The author and George G. Eck, Dorsey & 
Whitney LLP, were the trial attorneys for plaintiff Kennedy Building Associates in 
Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-1833, slip op. (D. Minn. May 31, 
2002) (judgment entered) discussed in this article.  The views expressed in this 
article are those of the author only and not those of any client or of Dorsey & 
Whitney LLP.
1. 623 N.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Minn. 2001).
2. 314 N.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Minn. 1982).
3. 511 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Minn. 1994).
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/12
KLASS-EXPANSION OF PUN. FINAL 8-16-03.DOC 9/15/2003 5:11 PM
2003] PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER JENSEN v. WALSH 179
opened up the possibilities of many new punitive damages claims in 
cases solely involving damage to real property, including cases of 
environmental contamination.
These possibilities were realized in what may be the first case 
in Minnesota involving damage solely to property that applied 
Jensen and resulted in a significant punitive damages verdict.  In 
Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc.,4 a jury in federal district 
court in Minnesota awarded $5 million in punitive damages to the 
plaintiff for environmental contamination to property in the
absence of personal injury.  This punitive damages award is
significant not only because it appears to be the first of its kind in 
Minnesota, but because it illustrates how Jensen has and will
continue to have a profound effect on environmental litigation in 
the State of Minnesota.  This article explains how the law of 
punitive damages has developed in Minnesota both before and 
after Jensen, and illustrates the significance of the Jensen case 
through a detailed discussion of the facts and outcome of the 
Kennedy Building Associates case.
Section II of this article discusses the purpose of punitive 
damages, the process in Minnesota by which a punitive damages 
claim may be added to a case, and the circumstances under which 
punitive damages may be awarded.5  Section III of this article 
discusses the role of the courts in reviewing a jury’s award of 
punitive damages in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases 
placing constitutional limits on punitive damages.6  Section IV of 
this article discusses the development of the unique “personal 
injury” requirement for punitive damages claims in Minnesota and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s subsequent abandonment of that 
requirement in Jensen.7  Finally, Sections V and VI of this article 
discuss the Kennedy Building Associates case in detail, considering 
both the offensive possibilities and defensive risks posed by Jensen in 
environmental cases and other property damage cases where, until 
recently, the specter of punitive damages simply was not present.8
This article concludes that by allowing punitive damages to be 
included in environmental contamination and other property
4. Kennedy Bldg. Assoc. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 10 (D. 
Minn. May 31, 2002) (judgment entered).
5. See infra Part II. 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. See infra Parts V-VI.
3
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damages cases, the supreme court both reconciled its case law with 
the language of the state’s punitive damages statute and, more 
importantly, has significantly increased the value of these cases for 
plaintiffs and significantly altered the risk assessment for
defendants.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW IN MINNESOTA
Punitive or “exemplary” damages have long been part of the 
American legal landscape, dating back to 1791, and, prior to that, 
part of the historic jurisprudence of England and ancient Rome 
and Greece.9  The purpose of punitive damages, according to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, is “to punish the perpetrator, to deter 
repeat behavior and to deter others from engaging in similar 
behavior.”10  Similar to criminal punishment, punitive damages 
serve important retributive and general deterrent functions.11  In 
1978, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes
section 549.20, codifying the current common law approach
governing punitive damages, which allowed for punitive damages 
where there was clear and convincing evidence of “willful
9. For a discussion of the historical origins of punitive damages see 1
LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 1.0-1.4, at 1-16
(4th ed. 2000) (noting the existence of punitive damages in the Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., in ancient Greek and Roman law, Hittite law, and the 
Bible); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive 
Damage Awards:  Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1284-1304
(1993) (detailing punitive damages from ancient times to the English and
American legal systems). 
10. Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Minn. 2001); see also Hodder v. 
Goodyear, 426 N.W.2d 826, 837 (Minn. 1990) (stating that the purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish and deter conduct); Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807,
816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“Punitive damages serve to punish wrongdoers and 
deter others from similar conduct.”) (citing Shetka v. Kueppers Von Feldt & 
Salmen, 454 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn. 1990)).
11. The purposes of punitive damages are generally considered to be:  (1) to 
punish the defendant for its actions and (2) to deter such conduct by others in the 
future. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 
9 (5th ed. 1984) (main purpose of punitive damages is to punish defendant and 
deter defendant and others from acting in a similar manner); SCHLUETER &
REDDEN, supra note 9, at 19 (the most widely accepted purpose of punitive 
damages has been punishment and deterrence); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 
1318-28 (purpose of punitive damages generally articulated by courts as
punishment and deterrence, retribution, encouraging private attorneys general, 
and bridging the gap between criminal and tort law).
4
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indifference to the rights or safety of others.”12  Under Minnesota
law, punitive damages are the province of the trier of fact.  There is 
no statutory cap on punitive damages, nor automatic entitlement to 
such damages in private actions.13  There are, however, limits to the 
jury’s discretion.  While there are no specific caps or limits, courts 
are specifically authorized to reduce punitive damages when they 
are unreasonably excessive.14
A. Standard for Adding and Recovering Punitive Damages Claims in 
Minnesota
In Minnesota, a claim for punitive damages must present a 
case for deliberate disregard that is fully supported by admissible 
evidence.  The reason for this is understandable: if a plaintiff is able 
to include a claim for punitive damages, it significantly and
unpredictably increases the value of the plaintiff’s claims, making 
settlement more difficult.15  Thus, Minnesota law provides by statute 
12. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1978).  In 1986, the statute was amended to include
gender neutral terms.  In 1990, “willful indifference” was changed to “deliberate 
disregard,” and “deliberate disregard” was defined further to clarify the conduct 
necessary for the imposition of punitive damages. See infra notes 26-29 and 
accompanying text.  For a discussion of the history of punitive damages in
Minnesota, see Tracy M. Borash, Note, Punitive Damages in Non-Personal Injury 
Cases: Minnesota’s Approach to Punishment and Deterrence, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
213, 220-22 (1997).
13. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-1021(1)(a) (1987) (limiting punitive 
damages awards to the amount of actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) 
(West 1997) (limiting punitive damages to three times the amount of
compensatory damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (exemplary damages may 
not exceed two times the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000,
whichever is greater); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (appendix to dissenting opinion containing multistate
survey of legislative caps and other restrictions on recovery of punitive damages).
14. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (2002) (requiring courts to consider factors that 
“justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages”). See also infra Part III 
(discussing constitutional limits on punitive damages).
15. There have been a significant number of recent articles on the actual and 
“perceived” impacts of punitive damages on litigation and settlement. See, e.g.,
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES
623, 629 (1997) (data on punitive damages suggests rationality and connection to 
compensatory damages at trial court level); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An 
Antidote to an Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (reviewing empirical studies on 
punitive damages); Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on 
Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 208 (concluding that data showing rarity and 
predictability of punitive damages verdicts and difficulty of collecting them post-
trial suggests fears of business community are exaggerated); Dan Quayle, Civil
Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 564-65 (1992) (arguing that to reduce threat 
5
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that plaintiffs may not allege punitive damages in their initial 
complaints but must first obtain leave of the court based upon a 
prima facie showing of entitlement.16  Accordingly, Minnesota law 
essentially requires the trial court to direct a portion of the verdict 
against the plaintiff if the evidence of deliberate disregard is 
insufficient.17  In reaching such a determination, the court makes 
no credibility rulings, nor does the court consider any challenge, by 
cross-examination or otherwise, to the plaintiff’s proof.18
When presented with a motion to permit a punitive damages 
claim, the trial court must do more than “rubber stamp” the 
allegations in the motion papers.  “Rather, the judge must ascertain 
whether there exists prima facie evidence that the defendants acted 
with [deliberate disregard].”19  Thus, Minnesota judges perform an 
important gatekeeper function in determining the punitive
damages claims that may go before a jury.
of runaway juries, punitive damages should be restricted by requiring intentional 
conduct, capping awards, bifurcating proceedings, and having judges rather than 
juries set awards).
16. MINN. STAT. § 549.191 (2002).  “Prima facie evidence is evidence which, if 
unrebutted, would support a judgment in the movant’s favor.”  Swanlund v. 
Shimano Indus. Corp., 459 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1979)). See also Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 
251 (Minn. 2001) (stating that section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes was 
enacted against a backdrop of concern over the increasing number of punitive 
damages awards in products liability cases and reflected an intent to limit punitive 
damages in civil actions).
17. Ulrich v. City of Crosby, 848 F. Supp. 861, 867 (D. Minn. 1994).  Under 
Minnesota law, the standard for a directed verdict is that “the trial court must
consider the record as a whole and treat as credible evidence for the adverse party and 
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.”  Midland Nat’l 
Bank v. Perranoski, 299 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Minn. 1980) (emphasis added).
18. McCloud v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 1996 WL 509846, at *5 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 10, 1996) (stating that the court may not consider evidence presented 
by the defendant when determining whether the plaintiff met her burden of 
production for amending her complaint); Swanlund, 459 N.W.2d at 154.
19. Swanlund, 459 N.W.2d at 154 (citing Shetka v. Kueppers, Kueppers, Von 
Feldt & Salmen, 454 N.W.2d 916, 918 n.1 (Minn. 1990)).  Although courts
generally appear to limit review to information submitted by the plaintiff in 
support of a motion to amend, at least one court cited the “rubber stamp” 
language to support its review of deposition testimony not submitted by the 
plaintiff. See Olson v. Snap Prod., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(refusing to allow amendment to add punitive damages claim).
6
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B. Conduct Required for Punitive Damages—“Clear and Convincing
Evidence of Deliberate Disregard”
Once a punitive damages claim is added to a case, such
damages are recoverable “only upon clear and convincing evidence 
that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the 
rights or safety of others.”20  “To be ‘clear and convincing,’ there 
must be ‘more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’”21  “Where the evidence is 
sufficient to permit the Jury to conclude that it is ‘highly probable’ 
that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard to the rights or 
safety of others, the ‘clear and convincing’ standard would be 
satisfied.”22  The legislature enacted the higher standard of proof to 
provide additional safeguards for defendants because of the “quasi-
criminal” nature of punitive damages.23
A defendant has acted with “deliberate disregard” if the
defendant has “knowledge of facts or intentionally disregards facts 
that create a high probability of injury to the rights or safety of 
others” and the defendant “deliberately proceeds to act in
conscious or intentional disregard of the high degree of probability 
of injury” or “deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the 
high probability of injury . . . .”24  As a result of this standard, 
“punitive damages may only be awarded when a defendant’s
conduct reaches a threshold level of culpability.”25
Until 1990, Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 provided that 
punitive damages would be allowed in civil actions only upon clear 
and convincing evidence that the acts of defendants show a “willful 
indifference” to the rights or safety of others.26  In interpreting this 
20. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1 (2002).
21. Ulrich, 848 F. Supp. at 868 (citing Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 
895 (Minn. 1978)).
22. Id. (citing Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 659 
(Minn. 1987)).
23. Hearing on H.F. 338 Before the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Comm., 1978 
Minnesota Leg. Sess. Feb. 22, 1978 (audiotape); see also Lewis v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 891 (Minn. 1986) (“The concern of the
legislature in enacting the punitive damages statute, section 549.20, was to limit 
the frequency and amounts of punitive damage awards.”) (citing Minnesota-Iowa
Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass’n, 294 N.W.2d 297, 311 (Minn. 
1980)).
24. MINN. STAT. § 549.20(b)(1)-(2).
25. Ulrich, 848 F. Supp. at 867.
26. § 549.20, subd. 1 (1979).
7
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provision, Minnesota courts had held that “the mere existence of 
negligence or of gross negligence does not rise to the level of 
willful indifference so as to warrant a claim for punitive damages.”27
Rather, a showing of malicious, willful, or reckless disregard for the 
rights of others was required.28
In 1990, the Minnesota Legislature amended section 549.20 by
replacing the phrase “willful indifference” with “deliberate
disregard.”29  The term “deliberate disregard” is defined in the 
amended statute.30  The Minnesota courts, without much
explanation, have characterized the new standard as a “heightened 
one.”31 The phrase “deliberate disregard” has been interpreted by 
the court of appeals as requiring “maliciousness, an intentional or 
willful failure to inform or act.”32  Thus, mere indifference to a risk 
to the rights or safety of others is not a sufficient basis for punitive 
damages.33  Instead, one must have knowledge of the risk and then 
27. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 381 (Minn. 1990); accord
Herbst v. N. States Power Co., 432 N.W.2d 463, 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that although NSP was grossly negligent with respect to the explosion of 
natural gas in a transmission pipeline because it failed to locate and expose the 
pipeline, prohibited plaintiff’s employer from locating the pipeline, did not 
consider reducing the pressure in the pipeline, and lacked a safety program that 
met even minimal standards, these findings did not support a basis for a punitive 
damages award).
28. Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Minn. 1980) 
(citing Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361, 364, 191 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1971) and 
Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W. 158, 158 (1902)).
29. § 549.20, subd. 1. 
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. McCloud v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 1996 WL 509846, at *5 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 10, 1996); Bougie v. Sibley Manor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 493, 500 n.4 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Hanks v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 493 N.W.2d 302, 311 n.3 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993); see also Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. 2001) 
(“The 1990 amendment further limited punitive damages by defining deliberate 
disregard.”).
32. Beniek v. Textron, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 719, 722-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing Wikert v. N. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987)).  Arguably the omission of the term “reckless disregard” from the case law 
definition of “deliberate disregard” as compared to “willful indifference” is
illustrative of the “heightened standard” alluded to by the courts.  It appears, 
however, that the post-amendment case limiting “deliberate disregard” to willful or 
intentional acts actually relied on a pre-amendment case interpreting “willful 
indifference” for support. Compare Cobb, 295 N.W.2d at 237 with Beniek, 479 
N.W.2d at 722-23 (citing Wikert, 402 N.W.2d at 178).
33. See Wikert, 402 N.W.2d at 183 (“Something more than mere indifference 
to the rights and safety of others . . . must be present to allow the ‘extraordinary’ 
remedy of punitive damages.”); Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, 
Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that more than “mere
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/12
KLASS-EXPANSION OF PUN. FINAL 8-16-03.DOC 9/15/2003 5:11 PM
2003] PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER JENSEN v. WALSH 185
consciously or “deliberately” decide to disregard the risk.34
C. Statutory Factors Guiding the Award of Punitive Damages
In Minnesota, the fact finder is directed to consider the
following factors in determining an award of punitive damages:
• the seriousness of hazard to the public arising from the 
defendant’s misconduct;
• the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
• the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
• the degree of the defendant’s awareness of the hazard and of 
its excessiveness;
• the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of 
the misconduct;
• the number and level of employees involved in causing or 
concealing the misconduct;
• the financial condition of the defendant; and
• the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed 
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including 
compensatory and punitive damages awards to the plaintiff 
and other similarly situated persons, and the severity of any 
criminal penalty to which the defendant may be subject.35
The courts, both trial and appellate, are to use these factors 
when reviewing a punitive damages award.36  In Minnesota, the trial 
indifference” is required to support a prima facie case under section 549.20); 
Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing 
punitive damages award despite finding that defendant knew, and should have 
known, of its employee’s longstanding pattern of sexual harassment of female 
employees, and that defendant failed to take proper remedial action).
34. See Olson v. Snap Prod. Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1036-37 (D. Minn. 
1998) (finding that evidence the manufacturer deceptively labeled its “fix a flat” 
tire inflator as “non-explosive” to preserve its market advantage, even though it 
knew of the high probability of tire welding-explosions, was sufficient under 
Minnesota law to entitle consumer to assert punitive damages claim for injuries 
sustained when the tire injected with the product exploded); Gryc v. Dayton 
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 739-40 (Minn. 1980) (awarding punitive damages 
after four-year-old girl was severely injured when her pajamas caught fire over a 
stove, where evidence showed that the manufacturer knew prior to the accident 
that the pajamas were highly flammable, but rejected an available flame resistant 
treatment for economic reasons).
35. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (2002).
36. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 5 (2002); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
707 F. Supp. 1517, 1537 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that a $7 million punitive 
damages award was not “shockingly excessive” based on profits defendant gained 
9
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court’s review of punitive damages is often more rigorous than
other types of damages, and it has broad discretion in determining 
whether to set aside a verdict as excessive.37  A new trial or 
remittitur is appropriate if the trial court determines the jury’s 
award of punitive damages is so grossly excessive as to “shock the 
conscience” of the court.38  Generally, the trial court’s authority to 
exercise its discretion in granting or denying remittitur within the 
statutory guidelines is reviewed deferentially and will be reversed 
only if there is a clear abuse of discretion.39  The Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, has stated that it is 
appropriate for the court to set the remittitur so as to permit 
recovery of the highest amount that the jury could have awarded.40
III. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS AND THE “THREE GUIDEPOSTS”
Any treatment of punitive damages in Minnesota or any other 
state is no longer complete without a discussion of the
constitutional limits that have been placed on punitive damages 
awards in recent years.  The constitutional constraints on a jury’s 
award of punitive damages have recently been the subject of 
considerable debate, both in the courts and in scholarly
from selling intrauterine device that caused plaintiff’s infertility, defendant’s
disregard of risks, and defendant’s financial condition).
37. See Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 813 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating “open-ended and volatile nature of punitive 
damages requires a reviewing court to exercise close supervision over the award”) 
(citing Estate of Hartz v. Nelson, 437 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) and 
Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 835 (Minn. 1990)).
38. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 59.01; Foster v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 250 F.3d 
1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Am. Bus. Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 
F.2d 1135, 1146 (8th Cir. 1986));  see also Am. Bus. Interiors, Inc., 798 F.2d at 1146 
(stating that although state law principles govern whether punitive damages are 
available for a state law claim, the proper role of federal courts in reviewing the 
size of jury verdicts is a matter of federal law).
39. See Mrozka, 482 N.W.2d at 813. But see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001) (regarding the appellate court’s 
obligation to conduct de novo review in cases where punitive damages implicate 
constitutional concerns).
40. Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1536 & n.19 (stating that although state law 
governs the issue of the excessiveness of a verdict in a diversity action, the issue of 
whether the appellate court should grant a new trial on remittitur is a procedural 
question to be decided under federal law).
10
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publications.41  This is because, in the past ten years, several
significant decisions addressed the court’s constitutional review of 
the jury’s punitive damages award, including a U.S. Supreme Court 
case decided just this year.  These constitutional constraints are a 
dramatic departure from traditional punitive damages review
which, until 1991, was virtually the sole province of state law.
Constitutional limitations on punitive damages were first
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip,42 elaborated on in TXO Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp.,43 and given real force first in the landmark 
case of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,44 and then again this year 
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.45  In BMW,
a case involving a fraud claim based on an automobile dealer’s
failure to disclose that an automobile had been repainted prior to 
delivery, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a state court punitive 
damages award for the first time in history, finding the award 
excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause (both the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments) of the Constitution and remanding 
the case to the Alabama state court for determination of the 
appropriate amount of punitive damages.46  In reaching this
decision, the Court reviewed the reasonableness of the punitive
damages award by examining three “guideposts”: (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio of the 
punitive damages award to the actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff; and (3) comparing the punitive damages award and the 
civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable 
41. For recent treatment of the constitutional review of punitive damages 
awards see, for example, Mark A. Kugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the Road”: 
Theoretical Justification vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52
SYRACUSE L. REV. 803 (2002); Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death 
Knell for Jury Assessed Punitive Damages?  A Critical Re-examination of the American Jury,
36 U.S.F. L. REV. 411 (2002); Amanda L. Maxfield, Punitive Damages: Cooper
Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group:  Will a Constitutional Objection to the
Excessiveness of a Punitive Damages Award Save Defendants from Oklahoma’s Punitive 
Damages Statute?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 449 (2002); Paul M. Sykes, Marking a Road to 
Nowhere?  Supreme Court Sets Punitive Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. 
REV. 1084 (1997).
42. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
43. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
44. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
45. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
46. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586 (1996).
11
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misconduct.47
The remainder of this Section addresses each of the Court’s 
“guideposts” in the context of the key U.S. Supreme Court cases 
that have been decided both before and after the decision in BMW.
A review of these cases indicates that while the Court has now 
established some outer constitutional limits on punitive damages, 
significant leeway remains for juries to implement state directives 
on punitive damages and significant discretion to grant such 
awards based on the specific facts of each case.
A. The Degree of Reprehensibility of the Defendant’s Conduct
In BMW, the Supreme Court stated that “[p]erhaps the most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct.”48  The Court’s views on the first BMW guidepost are best 
illustrated in TXO Production Corp., as well as in BMW itself and this 
year’s decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell.
1. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
In TXO, the Court found that a significant punitive damages 
award was not excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in a common law slander of title 
action brought originally in West Virginia state court.49  The 
respondents obtained a judgment against the petitioner TXO 
47. Id. at 574-83.  In 2001, the Supreme Court issued another significant 
punitive damages decision, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424 (2001), in which it held in a trademark infringement case that when a 
punitive damages award implicates constitutional concerns, the appellate court 
reviews the constitutionality of the award de novo rather than under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Cooper, 523 U.S. at 443. See also Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. 
Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (holding an amendment to the Oregon
Constitution prohibiting judicial review of the amount of punitive damages 
awarded by a jury “unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to 
support the verdict” violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
48. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852) 
(emphasis added)); see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reviewing court “should examine the gravity of the defendant’s conduct and the 
harshness of the award of punitive damages”).
49. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 466. 
12
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Production Corp. for $19,000 in actual damages and $10 million in 
punitive damages.50  TXO had approached Alliance Resources with 
what seemed like a “phenomenal offer” for buying of oil and gas 
royalties.51  TXO then investigated the background of the property 
and represented to Alliance Resources that it was possible that a 
1958 deed had conveyed oil and gas royalties to another party even 
though TXO knew this to be untrue.52  TXO then obtained the 
1958 deed from the other party and brought a declaratory
judgment action to quiet title to the oil and gas royalties.53  The 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that TXO
“‘knowingly and intentionally brought a frivolous declaratory
judgment action’ when its ‘real intent’ was ‘to reduce the royalty 
payments under a 1,002.74-acre oil and gas lease,’ and thereby 
‘increas[e] its interest in the oil and gas rights.’”54  The West 
Virginia court found that TXO had asserted a claim to title to the 
oil and gas under the property by virtue of the quitclaim deed “but 
that the deed was a ‘nullity.’”55
Alliance’s counterclaim for slander of title was subsequently 
tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict of $19,000 in compensatory
damages and $10 million in punitive damages.56  In addition to the 
evidence that TXO knew that Alliance had good title to the oil and 
gas and that TXO had acted in bad faith when it advanced a claim 
on the basis of the worthless quitclaim deed in an effort to 
renegotiate its royalty arrangement, Alliance also introduced
evidence showing that TXO was a large company in its own right 
and a wholly owned subsidiary of an even larger company; that the 
anticipated gross revenues from oil and gas development—and
therefore the amount of royalties that TXO sought to
renegotiate—were substantial; and that TXO had engaged in 
similar nefarious activities in its business dealings in other parts of 
the country.57
Based on these facts, the Court held that even though the 
punitive damages award was 526 times as large as the actual
50. Id. at 450.
51. Id. at 447.
52. Id. at 448-49.
53. Id. at 449.
54. Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 875, 
877 (W. Va. 1992)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 450. 
57. Id. at 450-51.
13
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damages award, the award did not violate the Due Process Clause 
based in part on the petitioner’s “malicious and fraudulent course 
to win back, either in whole or in part, the lucrative stream of 
royalty it had ceded to Alliance.”58  The Court found that the 
punitive damages were appropriate because:
[I]n light of the amount of money potentially at stake, the 
bad faith of petitioner, the fact that the scheme employed 
in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery 
and deceit, and petitioner’s wealth we are not persuaded 
that the award was so ‘grossly excessive’ as to be beyond 
the power of the State to allow.59
The Court also addressed TXO’s contention that the
admission of evidence of similar wrongdoing in other parts of the 
country, as well as the evidence of its impressive net worth, led the 
jury to base its award on impermissible passion and prejudice.60
The Court found that it was “well-settled law . . . [that] factors such 
as these are typically considered in assessing punitive damages.”61
Thus, in TXO, the Court made clear that the conduct of the 
defendant, rather than the damage resulting from that conduct, 
must be the primary focus of any assessment of punitive damages.
2. BMW of North America v. Gore
The BMW case was a significant turning point for the Court, in 
that it was the first time the Court struck down a state punitive 
damages award on constitutional grounds.62  In BMW, the plaintiff 
brought an action against the foreign automobile manufacturer, 
American distributor, and dealer based on the distributor’s failure 
to disclose that the automobile he had purchased had been
repainted after being damaged prior to delivery.63  Originally the 
jury had awarded $4 million in punitive and $4000 in compensatory 
damages.64  The Alabama Supreme Court found the punitive
damages were excessive and decreased the amount of punitive 
damages to $2 million for a 500:1 ratio between punitive and 
58. Id. at 462.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 462 n.28. 
61. Id.
62. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996). 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 565.
14
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compensatory damages.65
In vacating the award, the Court found that “none of the 
aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible
conduct [were] present” in the case.66  The plaintiff suffered only 
economic harm, “the presale refinishing . . . had no effect on [the 
car’s] performance or safety features, or . . . appearance,” and 
there was no evidence of BMW’s “indifference to or reckless 
disregard for the health and safety of others.”67  The Court further 
concluded that the punitive damages were excessive because the 
record did not show any “deliberate false statements, acts of 
affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper 
motive as were present in Haslip and TXO Production Corporation.”68
3. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell
Earlier this year, the Court refined the reprehensibility
analysis, holding that evidence of misconduct by the defendant in 
other jurisdictions that was not similar to the conduct specifically 
directed toward the plaintiffs could not form the primary basis of a 
finding of reprehensible conduct.69 Campbell involved a claim in 
Utah state court for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress brought by the Campbells, holders of
automobile insurance, against their insurer State Farm.70  The 
Campbells brought this suit against State Farm, which had refused 
to accept reasonable settlement offers for a fatal car crash while
representing the Campbells under subrogation.71  The car crash 
case resulted in a judgment against the Campbells for $135,849 
beyond the policy limits, which State Farm initially refused to 
cover.72  Despite State Farm’s later acquiescence to cover the 
amount in excess of the policy limits, the Campbells proceeded to 
sue State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress based on the previous case.73  In the second case, 
65. Id. at 567.
66. Id. at 576.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 579-80.
69. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1526 (2003). 
70. Id. at 1518. 
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
15
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the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a compensatory damage award 
of $1 million for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
reinstated the jury’s original verdict of $145 million in punitive 
damages.74
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the punitive damages award 
and remanded the case to the Utah courts to recalculate punitive 
damages.75  On the issue of reprehensibility, the Court stated that 
“[w]hile we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive 
damages based upon State Farm’s conduct toward the Campbells, a 
more modest punishment for the reprehensible conduct could 
have satisfied the State’s legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts 
should have gone no further.”76  The basis for this statement was 
the Court’s conclusion that the punitive damages award was not 
based on the conduct directed toward the Campbells, but on 
extensive expert testimony admitted into evidence that State Farm’s 
actions in that case were merely part of a national scheme to meet 
corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims companywide.77
In holding this evidence could not be used to determine 
reprehensibility, the Court focused on the fact that the evidence of 
nationwide conduct “bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm,”78
and thus could not be used to show motive or repeated
misconduct.79  Thus, while the Court left open the possibility that 
evidence of “other acts” similar to the misconduct at issue could be 
used to meet the reprehensibility element, unrelated bad acts by 
the defendant could not.80
B. Ratio of the Punitive Damages Award to the Actual Harm Inflicted
on the Plaintiff
The second guidepost used to determine whether a punitive 
damages award is excessive is “its ratio to the actual harm inflicted 
74. The jury’s original award was $2.6 million in compensatory damages and 
$145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and 
$25 million respectively. Id. at 1519.
75. Id. at 1526. 
76 .. Id. at 1521.
77. Id. at 1518-19.
78. Id. at 1523. 
79. Id. at 1522.
80. Id. at 1523.  Indeed, the Court specifically stated that “evidence of other 
acts need not be identical to have relevance in the calculation of punitive damages 
. . . .” Id.
16
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on the plaintiff.”81  In recent years, the Court has stressed the 
importance of a reasonable ratio between actual or potential harm 
to the plaintiff and punitive damages, but has declined to impose a 
maximum ratio across the board, leaving the state courts with 
considerable discretion in this area.82  In Haslip, the Court
concluded that even though a punitive damages award of “more 
than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages” might be 
“close to the line,” it did not “cross the line into the area of 
constitutional impropriety.”83  In TXO, the Court refined the 
analysis by confirming that the proper inquiry is “whether there is a 
reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and 
the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as 
the harm that has actually occurred.”84  Although at first glance it 
seems that the Supreme Court upheld a 526:1 ratio in TXO, the 
Court reasoned that the ratio was actually only 10:1 by examining 
the difference between the punitive damages award and the
possible harm to the victim if the defendant had “succeeded in its 
illicit scheme.”85  In BMW, the Court stressed that:
[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly 
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, 
for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in 
only a small amount of economic damages.  A higher ratio 
may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to 
detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might 
have been difficult to determine.  “We need not, and 
indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every
81. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996) (citing TXO Prod. 
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459 (1993); cf. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (holding that a punitive damages award for 200 times 
the out-of-pocket expenses of the respondent was proper because the award did 
not lack objective criteria).
82. Indeed, the Court has reiterated that it is appropriate for the states to 
continue to retain flexibility regarding additional factors juries may consider in 
awarding punitive damages, including the defendant’s financial condition and the 
profits that flowed from the misconduct.  State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003); see also TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 464 
n.29 (reaffirming that the financial condition of the defendant is one factor that 
may be taken into account in assessing punitive damages).
83. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.
84. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460 (quoting Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 
413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991)).
85. Id. at 462.
17
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case.  We can say, however, that [a] general concer[n] 
of reasonableness . . . properly enter[s] into the
constitutional calculus.”86
This variation in ratios is reflected in several recent and
significant punitive damages awards.  For example in Romo v. Ford 
Motor Co.,87 the California Court of Appeals upheld an award of 
$290 million in punitive damages and $6.226 million in
compensatory damages (a ratio of 40:1) for an SUV rollover killing 
three passengers.  The court determined the award was appropriate 
because Ford’s conduct could have constituted involuntary
manslaughter and the award only constituted 1.2 percent of its net 
worth.  In another recent case, a Kansas trial court awarded $15 
million in punitive damages and $198,400 in compensatory
damages (a ratio of 80:1) against a cigarette manufacturer who was 
found to have intentionally misrepresented the dangers of
smoking.88  In another cigarette case, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
allowed a $79.5 million punitive damages award to stand, equal to 
about two and half weeks of profits of the manufacturer (ratio of 
97:1).  The jury based its award on finding the manufacturer 
intentionally misrepresented the dangers of smoking.89  Similarly, 
in October 2002, a California jury awarded a smoker $28 billion in 
punitive damages and $850,000 in compensatory damages based on 
theories of fraud and negligence by the defendant cigarette
company.90  The California Supreme Court subsequently reduced 
the punitive damages portion of the verdict to $28 million (ratio of 
33:1), calling the jury’s figure legally excessive.91
How these ratios hold up on appeal will depend in large part 
on the lower courts’ application of the Supreme Court’s recent 
Campbell decision.  Since the Campbell decision was issued on April 
7, 2003, it has had an immediate impact on pending punitive 
86. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996) (quoting TXO
Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 458). See also Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
87. 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (2002), rev. denied (Cal. 2002), vacated, 123 S.Ct. 
2072 (May 19, 2003).
88. See Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan. 
2002).
89. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 51 P.3d 670 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied,
61 P.3d 938 (Or. 2002).
90. Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. BC249171, 2002 WL 31833905, at *1 
(Cal. Dec. 18, 2002).
91. Id. at *3.
18
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damages cases.92  Indeed, the Supreme Court has granted several 
petitions for writ of certiorari in punitive damages cases, vacated 
the judgments, and remanded those cases to the lower courts for 
further consideration in light of Campbell.93
It is important to keep in mind that even in Campbell, the 
Court reaffirmed that it has been “reluctant to identify concrete
constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, 
to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award” and again
expressly declined to impose a “bright-line” ratio that a punitive 
damages award cannot exceed.94  The Court indicated that in 
practice, “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with 
due process” but recognized there were exceptions to this practice, 
such as where a particularly egregious act results in only a small 
amount of harm.95  The Court repeated that “[t]he precise award in 
any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the 
plaintiff.”96  In applying these rules to the case at bar, the Court 
stated that it had “no doubt that there is a presumption against an 
award that has a 145 [to] 1 ratio.”97  Moreover, the compensatory 
award was substantial ($1 million for a year and a half of emotional 
distress), it resulted from solely economic harm rather than
personal injury, and the type of injury compensated (emotional
distress) already included a punitive element and so the purposes 
of punitive damages had already been met through the
compensatory award.98
Thus, despite the Court’s rejection of the 145 to 1 ratio in 
92. See, e.g., McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 2d 1225, 1228-29
(N.D. Ala. 2003); Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 985, 960-61 (N.D. 
Iowa 2003); TVT Records & TVT Music v. The Island of Jam Music Group, 257 F. 
Supp. 2d 737, 743-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Richard Homes Bldg. Co., LLC, 291 
B.R. 727, 738-39 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003).
93. See, e.g., Anchor Hocking Inc. v. Waddill, 123 S. Ct. 1781 (2003) (mem.); 
Cass v. Stephens, 123 S. Ct. 2213 (2003) (mem.); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Bayer
CropScience, 123 S. Ct. 1828 (2003) (mem.); Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, 123 S. Ct. 
2072 (2003) (mem.); Ford Motor Co. v. Smith 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003) (mem.); Key 
Pharm. Inc. v. Edwards, 123 S. Ct. 1781 (2003) (mem.); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Textron Fin. Corp., 123 S. Ct. 1783 (2003) (mem.); San Paolo U.S. Holding Co. 
v. Simon, 123 S. Ct. 1828 (2003) (mem.). 
94. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Campbell based on the specific facts of that case, the Court did not 
depart from its precedent of consistently rejecting “‘the notion that 
the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, 
even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive 
award.’”99  In the end, the analysis of whether a punitive damages 
award is excessive is still a case-by-case determination, and the 
range of award ratios between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages may still vary significantly.
C. Comparison of the Punitive Damages Award and the Civil or 
Criminal Penalties that Could Be Imposed for Comparable 
Misconduct
As the Court stated in BMW, “[c]omparing the punitive
damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be 
imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third indicium of
excessiveness.”100  The rationale underlying this guidepost is the 
type of notice the defendant has that its conduct may subject it to a 
certain level of liability.101  In BMW, “the maximum civil penalty 
authorized by the Alabama Legislature for a violation of its
Deceptive Trade Practice Acts was $2,000.”102  In other states the 
maximum fine ranged from $50 for first offenses to $10,000.103  The 
Court reasoned that none of these fines would have given the 
defendant fair notice that violations would subject it to a
multimillion dollar penalty and, therefore, reversed the award on 
due process grounds.104  Similarly, in Campbell, the Court found that 
the most relevant civil sanction under Utah law for the wrong done 
to the Campbells was a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud, “an amount 
dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.”105
While these recent Supreme Court cases and their articulation 
of the “three guideposts” in no way displace Minnesota Statutes 
99. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 
(1996) and TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993)); see 
also TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Constitution 
identifies no particular multiple of compensatory damages as an acceptable limit 
for punitive awards; it does not concern itself with dollar amounts, ratios, or the 
quirks of juries in specific jurisdictions.”).
100. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.
101. Id. at 584.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1526 (2003).
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section 549.20 in governing awards of punitive damages in
Minnesota, they do form an outer constitutional boundary on the 
reasonableness of such damages.  However, as Haslip, TXO, BMW,
and even Campbell all make clear, there will continue to be
significant variation in punitive damages awards from case to case 
based on the various factors state laws direct juries to consider and 
the specific facts of each case.
IV. FROM GRYC TO JENSEN: THE PERSONAL INJURY REQUIREMENT
Apart from the constitutional limitations on punitive damages 
awards, a unique and unusual limitation on such awards existed in 
Minnesota until very recently.  Until the Jensen v. Walsh106 decision 
in 2001, a line of Minnesota Supreme Court cases appeared to 
preclude punitive damages in any case that did not involve
personal injury.  Because this limitation is not obvious from the 
punitive damages statute itself, a brief review of the statute and 
opinions prior to Jensen interpreting the statute is helpful.
First, the statute itself provides that punitive damages are 
available with proof of “deliberate disregard” for the “rights or
safety of others.”107  Nothing in the statute explicitly limits punitive 
damages to cases involving personal injury.  In fact, the use of the 
phrase “rights or safety” seems to suggest that harm to “rights” even 
without harm to “safety” can support a punitive damages claim.
For approximately twenty years prior to Jensen, however, the 
Minnesota courts did not broadly apply the statute.  In order to 
understand the concern that led to the courts’ narrow reading of 
the state punitive damages statute, we must start with Gryc v. Dayton 
Hudson Corp. 108  The Minnesota Supreme Court decided Gryc in 
1980, shortly after the statute was enacted, and then spent the next 
twenty years gradually developing its punitive damages
jurisprudence until 2001, when it shifted course dramatically in 
Jensen.
106. 623 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 2001).
107. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1(b) (2002) (emphasis added).
108. 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 1980) (products liability action brought 
against manufacturer of flannelette pajamas for injuries to child when the pajamas 
caught fire).
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A. The Expansion and Contraction of Punitive Damages: From Gryc
to Eisert and Keene
Gryc was decided in 1980, shortly after the Minnesota
Legislature codified the law of punitive damages.  In Gryc, a young 
child was badly burned when her pajamas ignited and burned 
rapidly when lit by a stovetop burner.109  The evidence at trial 
showed that the cotton used in the pajamas was highly flammable, 
there were commercially available chemicals that could have
increased the safety of the product or alternative fabrics that could 
have been used, and the manufacturer was aware of the risk.110  The 
jury awarded the plaintiff $750,000 in compensatory damages and 
$1 million in punitive damages.111  In reviewing the case, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court considered for the first time whether 
punitive damages may be awarded in a strict products liability 
action.112  After reviewing authority in other jurisdictions as well as 
the policy reasons for and against allowing such damages, the
supreme court held that punitive damages may properly be
awarded in strict products liability actions.113  In reaching this 
decision, the supreme court cited “the vital state interest of
protecting persons against personal injury.”114
Although Gryc focused on the need for deterrence in the 
context of protecting citizens from personal injury, nothing in Gryc
expressly precluded awarding punitive damages in cases that did 
not involve personal injury.  Two years later, however, in Eisert v. 
Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.,115 the supreme court appeared 
to take that step. Eisert involved claims of strict products liability 
against manufacturers, sellers, and applicators of insulation and 
paint for property damage resulting from a fire.116  In affirming the 
109. Id. at 729.
110. Id. at 730-31.
111. Id. at 729.
112. Id. at 732-33.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 737.  Based on this “vital state interest” the supreme court rejected 
respondent’s argument that the federal Flammable Fabrics Act pre-empted the 
state punitive damages remedy. Id.
115. 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
116. Id. at 227.  The fire also killed two high school students.  The decedents’ 
heirs brought separate claims for punitive damages but those claims were denied 
because Minnesota law at the time prohibited punitive damages in wrongful death 
claims. Id. at 227-28.  The Minnesota legislature has since amended the wrongful 
death statute to allow punitive damages. MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subd. 1 (2002).
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trial court’s refusal to allow the plaintiffs to assert a claim for 
punitive damages, the supreme court held that punitive damages 
“are not recoverable under a strict products liability theory for 
property damage” and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the 
motion to amend.117  The court cited the analysis in Gryc, which 
focused on the vital state interest of protecting persons against 
personal injury.118  The court elaborated on that principle as
follows:
The interests implicated in strict liability actions for injury 
solely to property are not so great as to warrant extension 
of this controversial remedy to those actions.  “[T]he very 
power of the remedy demands that judges exercise close 
control over the imposition and assessment of punitive 
damages.”  Although the nature of the plaintiff’s injury is 
not always listed as a factor in determining how to assess 
punitive damages, . . . it may reasonably be taken into 
account in deciding where punitive damages will be
allowed . . . .  Where that injury is limited to property 
damage, the public interest in punishment and
deterrence is largely satisfied by the plaintiff’s recovery of 
compensatory damages.  Punitive damages represent an 
extraordinary measure of deterrence.  Denying their
imposition in this case, after allowing punitive damages in 
strict liability actions for personal injury, reflects the
higher value our society places on the safety of persons 
than it does on the security of property.119
The next case in which the supreme court addressed the 
availability of punitive damages for claims not involving personal 
injury was Independent School District Number 622 v. Keene Corp.120 in 
1994.  A school district asserted strict products liability and other 
claims against manufacturers and others for the cost of removing 
asbestos from a high school.121  At trial, the jury awarded both 
compensatory and punitive damages.122  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals reduced the punitive damages award but otherwise
affirmed the case.123  On appeal to the supreme court, the school 
117. Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
120. 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1994).
121. Id. at 729.
122. Id. at 730.
123. Id.
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district argued that Eisert did not bar punitive damages because 
unlike Eisert, which only involved strict products liability claims, the 
school district had succeeded at trial on claims of negligence and 
fraud in addition to the strict products liability claim.124
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the distinction and, 
citing Eisert, reversed the award of punitive damages.125  The court 
stated that “[w]e believe now as we did in Eisert that denying 
punitive damages where a plaintiff suffers only property damage 
reflects the greater importance society places on protecting
people.”126  Thus, in Keene, the supreme court appeared to hold that 
the nature of the plaintiff’s injury—in addition to the defendant’s 
conduct—was not only a relevant consideration but a necessary 
predicate to allowing punitive damages.
B. Confusion in the Courts: Phelps and Molenaar
Two cases decided after Keene in the mid-1990s backed away 
from the apparent bright-line rule announced in Keene.  First, in 
1995, in Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.,127 the
supreme court affirmed an award of punitive damages in an
employment discrimination case without any reference to Eisert or 
Keene.  Building on this apparent redirection, the court of appeals,
in Molenaar v. United Cattle Co.,128 held that punitive damages were
available in a case not involving personal injury where the
defendant had engaged in conversion of the plaintiff’s cattle.  In 
Molenaar, the trial court allowed the plaintiff to add to a claim for 
punitive damages, and then after the jury awarded the plaintiff
$59,375 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive
damages, granted the defendant’s motion for JNOV on the
grounds that punitive damages could not be recovered absent 
personal injury.129
Reversing the trial court’s JNOV and reinstating the punitive
damages claim, the court of appeals engaged in a detailed analysis 
of Minnesota punitive damages law and the statute itself, and held 
that Keene was limited to products liability actions.130  The court 
124. Id. at 732.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 537 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1995).
128. 553 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
129. Id. at 426.
130. Id. at 428.
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focused on the fact that Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 allows 
recovery of punitive damages for violation of “rights” or “safety” 
and that violations of rights do not necessarily involve personal 
injury.131  The court went on to recognize that “[a]bsent punitive 
damages, one who intentionally and wrongfully takes another’s 
property has little to fear,” and that abolishing punitive damages 
“improves the profitability of theft.”132  Finally, the court noted that 
while some states had restricted or restructured punitive damages, 
the court was not aware of any state in the nation that has abolished 
punitive damages for injury to property while allowing punitive 
damages for personal injury.133
Compounding the uncertainty created by Phelps and Molenaar,
in 1998 the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
rejected the Molenaar analysis in Luigino’s Inc. v. Pezrow Cos.134  Based 
on a broad reading of Keene, personal injury was held a
requirement for all punitive damages cases under Minnesota law.135
Thus, throughout the 1990s, there was significant uncertainty 
regarding the availability of punitive damages in cases involving 
property damage and significant disagreement within Minnesota 
courts on how to apply Eisert and Keene.
C. A New Direction: Jensen v. Walsh
In March 2001, the supreme court explicitly disclaimed its
prior focus on the plaintiff’s injury and adopted the narrower 
reading of Eisert and Keene.  In Jensen v. Walsh, a houseboat owner 
sued a neighbor alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and intentional damage to property involving a dispute over river 
access.136  The trial court denied a motion to amend the complaint
to add a claim for punitive damages because the damage was only 
to property.137  The court of appeals affirmed and the en banc 
131. Id. at 428-29.
132. Id. at 429.
133. Id. at 429.
134. 178 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1998) (expressing “serious reservations”
concerning analytical soundness of Molenaar and refusing to allow punitive
damages to be asserted in breach of contract and fraud claims).
135. Id.; see also Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) 
(applying broad interpretation of Keene and holding punitive damages not
available for killing the plaintiff’s dog).
136. Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Minn. 2001).
137. Id. at 249.
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supreme court reversed.138  The supreme court held that a plaintiff 
could recover punitive damages in an action that involved only 
property damage so long as the claim was not one for strict
products liability.139  The court examined both the common law 
history of punitive damages as well as the court’s historic concern
regarding the large number of punitive damages verdicts in
products liability suits:
While Eisert and Keene reflect an intent to control
escalating lawsuits and awards in product liability actions 
where the only damage is to property, other claims of
property damage may be protected through an award of 
punitive damages.  Section 549.20 allows punitive
damages where there is deliberate disregard of the rights 
or safety of others.  Minn. Stat. 549.20, subd. 1.  Use of the 
disjunctive “or” indicates that the legislature intended to 
safeguard rights other than those relating to a person’s 
safety.  Therefore, section 549.20 does not limit its
application to claims of personal injury.140
Thus, the court returned to the plain language of the statute 
itself, essentially conducting the same analysis used by the court of 
appeals in Molenaar, and reached the same conclusion.  The 
supreme court went on to explain that its holding was based on the 
reality that “[w]ithout punitive damages, one who acts with
deliberate disregard of the rights or safety of others faces no 
greater penalty than a well-meaning but negligent offender.”141
The supreme court attempted to retain the core holdings of Eisert
and Keene in products liability cases while ensuring that the punitive 
and deterrent functions of punitive damages could still be used in 
other cases involving damage to property.  The supreme court 
expressly gave weight to the historic concerns that the threat of 
large punitive damages in products liability cases would impede the 
development of beneficial products to the marketplace.142
The impact of Jensen is significant.  In the last twenty years, 
punitive damages, an amazingly powerful force in litigation, have 
138. Id. at 248-49.
139. Id. at 251.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. (discussing the controversy surrounding punitive damages awards 
in products liability cases at the time Eisert and Keene were decided and citing 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris Industries, 
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)).
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simply been absent from a significant number of cases in
Minnesota ranging from fraud and misrepresentation to
environmental damage to property.143  As a result, many such cases 
with modest compensatory damages were never brought in the first 
place or were quickly settled for minimal amounts.  Likewise, 
egregious behavior in the context of real estate or personal
property transactions was seldom punished (as opposed to
compensated) through the civil justice system. Jensen has changed 
all that, opening a new chapter in civil damages law in the state.
V. THE IMPACT OF JENSEN IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES:
KENNEDY BUILDING ASSOCIATES V. VIACOM, INC.
A recent case in Minnesota federal court illustrates Jensen’s
immediate impact in the context of a case involving environmental 
contamination.144  In Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc.,145 the 
owner of a commercial building in northeast Minneapolis,
Kennedy Building Associates (“KBA”), brought suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota against Viacom, Inc., 
the successor to the building’s previous owner, Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,146 who had used the building to repair electrical 
143. As an illustration, none of the cases that led to the U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions discussed supra in Section III could even have been brought in
Minnesota prior to Jensen. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 
U.S. 424 (2001) (addressing trademark infringement); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (dealing with fraud relating to repainting automobile); TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (addressing slander of 
title); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (involving fraud 
against an insurance company).
144. Although Jensen was decided in 2001, there are only two published
decisions applying Jensen.  In In re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 652 
N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 667 
N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Jensen did not 
change the longstanding rule in Minnesota that punitive damages are not
available in breach of contract actions absent an independent tort. Id. at 74-76.  In 
Williamson v. Prasciunas, 661 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), the court of 
appeals cited Jensen in a conversion case for the basic principle that “[p]unitive 
damages are available to a plaintiff even where the only damage is to property and 
are not limited to cases of personal injury.” Id. at 653.  The only other decision 
applying Jensen is an unpublished decision, Bratner Farms, Inc. v. Gardner, 2002 WL 
1163559, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2002), where the court of appeals upheld a 
trial court award of $50,000 in punitive damages based on a claim of trespass, in 
which $819 in rental value was awarded in compensatory damages.
145. No. 99-1833 (D. Minn. May 31, 2002) (judgment entered).
146. Westinghouse was the original owner of the site, but after Viacom bought 
Westinghouse (which changed its name to CBS Corp. after it purchased CBS in 
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transformers for sixty years.147  When KBA went to sell the building 
in 1997, a standard environmental site assessment was performed, 
which revealed PCB148 contamination in the soil, groundwater, and 
interior of the building.149  After working with the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency to determine the scope and extent of the 
contamination, KBA sued Viacom under state and federal
environmental cleanup laws and asserted common law tort claims 
to recover the money spent investigating the site, for damages for 
diminution in property value, and for an injunction to force 
Viacom to clean up the site.150
The Jensen decision was issued near the end of discovery, and 
KBA moved to amend its complaint to add a claim for punitive 
damages.  KBA cited evidence that Westinghouse was aware of 
extensive PCB contamination on the site when it sold the site in 
1980 to a third party and, by concealing the contamination, acted 
with deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of others.151
KBA’s motion was granted based on the recent change in the law 
and the case was tried to a jury over two weeks in January and 
February 2002.  The jury awarded KBA $5 million in punitive 
damages and $325,000 in compensatory damages and response
costs.152  The district court entered judgment in favor of KBA for 
these amounts and also ordered Viacom to clean up the property 
to a level where it would not require any deed restrictions on future 
use.153
the late 1990s), it became a successor in interest to Westinghouse’s liabilities. Id.,
slip op. at 2.
147. Id.
148. PCBs, or polychlorinated biphenyls, were first developed in the 1920s to 
serve as insulating liquid because of their stable, non-flammable characteristics.  In 
1971, in response to growing concerns regarding the toxicity of PCBs and their 
ability to bioaccumulate in the environment, Monsanto Co., the sole U.S.
producer of PCBs, voluntarily restricted sales of PCBs for all uses except the 
manufacture of sealed electrical equipment.  Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, 
Pollution Prevention and Environmental Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVT’L L.J. 1, 12 
(1997).  In 1976, in connection with Congress’ enactment of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2002) (“TSCA”), the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency severely restricted the continued use of PCBs. See 43 Fed. Reg. 
7150 (Feb. 17, 1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 31514 (May 31, 1979).
149. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 2.
150. Id. at 4-5.
151. See infra Section V.A. for discussion.
152. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 7, 9.
153. Id. at 9-10.  The case is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit. 
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The remaining sections of this article describe in more detail 
the facts and procedural history of the Kennedy Building Associates
case as a way of illustrating both how the legal landscape has 
changed in cases involving damage to property as a result of Jensen,
as well as how the facts of this particular case support a punitive 
damages award.
A. Westinghouse’s Use of PCBs at the Site and Deliberate Disregard of 
Risks
Westinghouse operated an electrical transformer repair facility 
on the site from the late 1920s until 1980.154  Westinghouse’s 
operations at the site consisted of the repair of both PCB
transformers and mineral oil transformers.155  PCBs, first developed 
for commercial use in the late 1920s, are viscous oily liquids that do 
not conduct electricity, are fire resistant, and are chemically
stable.156  While PCBs were originally thought by Westinghouse and 
others in the electrical industry to be an ideal insulator for
transformers because of these characteristics, it became apparent 
by at least the late 1960s that PCBs posed a serious threat to human 
health and the environment.157  Due to this threat, the federal 
government placed severe restrictions on the use and handling of 
PCBs starting in the mid-1970s and ultimately prohibited their 
production entirely.158
The PCB transformers Westinghouse repaired at the site 
between approximately 1930 and 1980 were as large as eight feet 
tall, six feet long, and four feet wide, and contained up to 600 
gallons of PCB fluid such as Inerteen, Westinghouse’s particular 
brand of PCB fluid.159  To repair these transformers, Westinghouse
employees opened up the transformers and removed the coils 
immersed in the PCB fluid inside.  Routine spills and leaks
occurred during this process.160  The evidence presented at trial 
established that Westinghouse operations also released PCBs into
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id..
159. See Testimony of Gerald Fisher at 117-18, Kennedy Bldg. Assoc. v. Viacom,
Inc., No. 99-1833 (D. Minn. May 31, 2002) (judgment entered) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Fisher].
160. Id. at 103-06.
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the environment both through overflows from an above-ground
storage tank located outside the building containing PCB-
contaminated waste oil and during the burning of PCB-
contaminated oil in the building’s furnace.161
In the early 1970s, as awareness about the harmful effects of 
PCBs grew and the need for strict PCB regulations came under 
consideration, Westinghouse conducted a study of PCB
contamination around some of its largest facilities in order to 
determine whether authorities would be able to trace the PCB 
contamination in the rivers, streams, and biota near Westinghouse 
facilities back to those Westinghouse plants.162  According to Dr. 
Thomas Munson, the former Westinghouse chemist who
supervised that study, the question to be answered by the study was
not whether Westinghouse facilities were releasing PCBs (that, 
according to Dr. Munson, was a given), but rather the extent of the 
contamination and whether authorities would be able to trace it 
back to Westinghouse facilities.163  With respect to Westinghouse
transformer repair facilities, Dr. Munson testified at trial that
Westinghouse knew that:
It simply wasn’t possible to handle gallon quantities of 
PCBs, pumping them into transformers, draining them 
out of transformers, without having some spillage.  And it 
was just a given at that time that every facility that had 
been doing that [repair operations] for any length of time 
would have spilled considerable amounts of PCBs.164
Dr. Munson testified that he urged top-level Westinghouse 
managers to report PCB contamination during the 1970s, but that 
a corporate decision was made not to reveal such contamination 
because the potential legal liability was too great.165  By 1976, 
Westinghouse management was also aware that mineral oil
161. Id. at 118-21.
162. Testimony of Dr. Thomas Munson at 77, Kennedy Bldg. Assoc. v. Viacom,
Inc., No. 99-1833 (D. Minn. May 31, 2002) (judgment entered) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Munson].
163. Id. (“And it was a given that the plants were contaminated.  The question 
was what do we do?  And my part of it was to, ah, do the studies as to whether the 
contamination would be easily traceable back to the plants.”).
164. Id. at 107. See also Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 3.
165. Munson, supra note 162, at 64-65, 107 (testifying that Westinghouse had a 
corporate practice of not reporting the release of PCBs into the environment and 
that he was told if he spoke with anyone regarding the results of his PCB studies 
he could be prosecuted, assessed fines and jailed); see also Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 
99-1833, slip op. at 3.
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transformers repaired at such facilities were often heavily
contaminated with PCBs, making the likelihood of PCB
contamination at those facilities even greater.166  In a 1979 rule 
implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act,167 EPA discussed 
the hazards of servicing PCBs transformers and banned the
practice of “rebuilding” transformers that had taken place at the 
KBA site for five decades.168
Despite Westinghouse’s knowledge by 1980 of the
environmental and health risks caused by PCBs and of the virtually 
certain PCB contamination at its long-term repair facilities,
Westinghouse sold the KBA site without conducting any
investigation, decontamination, or cleanup of PCBs.169  Local
Westinghouse employees, with no assistance from Westinghouse 
management, no training in cleaning up PCBs or decontaminating
the site and little or no knowledge of the harmful nature of PCBs, 
were left to move the necessary equipment to a new facility and 
sweep out the floors of the old building before turning over the 
keys.170  In 1980, Westinghouse sold the site to a real estate 
developer who, in turn, sold the site to KBA in 1982.171
B. The Discovery and Investigation of Contamination at the Site
In 1997, KBA entered into negotiations to sell the site.172  An 
environmental investigation conducted by the potential buyer’s 
consultant indicated the presence of PCBs on the property.  After 
further investigation by KBA confirmed the presence of PCBs, KBA 
reported the existence of the contamination to the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) and entered MPCA’s
166. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 3.
167. See supra note 148.
168. See 44 Fed. Reg. at 31531 (“Considering the PCB exposure that would
result if such servicing [including rebuilding] was permitted, EPA believes that 
these costs [of prohibiting rebuilding] are justified by the increased risk of harm 
to human health and the environment and concludes that such servicing of PCB 
Transformers presents an unreasonable risk.”).
169. Fisher, supra note 159, at 112-15 (stating Westinghouse never told the 
workers at the KBA site that they were working in a contaminated environment, 
never told workers that PCBs were toxic prior to 1980 when the government came 
out with restrictions on PCB use, and provided no engineers or other support to 
clean or decontaminate the building).
170. Id.
171. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 4.
172. Id. at 5.
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Voluntary Investigation and Cleanup (“VIC”) Program.173  As a 
result of the contamination and the uncertainty associated with it, 
the buyer withdrew its offer to purchase the site.174  Under the 
guidance of the MPCA and the Minnesota Department of Health, 
KBA continued to investigate and delineate the PCB contamination 
in the soil, groundwater, and building interior at the site, incurring 
MPCA-approved costs of $106,393.23.175
C. Current Contamination at the Site
The investigation conducted by KBA’s environmental
consultant under MPCA supervision revealed extensive
contamination of the soil, groundwater, and building interior at 
the site.176  The concentration of PCBs in the soil at the site ranged 
as high as 9100 mg/kg, compared to the MPCA’s allowable limit for 
PCB concentration in soil of 1.2 mg/kg.177  The concentration of 
PCBs in the groundwater at the site ranged as high as 37,000 
ì g/liter, compared to the MPCA’s allowable limit for PCB
concentration in groundwater of 0.04 ì g/liter.178  Levels of PCBs in 
wipe samples taken from the interior of the building ranged up to 
200 ì g/cm2, compared to a limit on acceptable PCB levels set by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and adopted by the 
Minnesota Department of Health at 10 ì g/cm2.179  Evidence at trial 
established that approximately 18,000 pounds of PCBs had been 
spilled on the site, based on the amount of PCB contamination 
present.180  The PCB contamination at the site has continued to 
migrate in the soil and groundwater due to the presence of
transformer mineral oil constituents acting as solvents in the soil 
and groundwater.181
D. Procedural History and Addition of Punitive Damages
After KBA’s efforts to have Viacom take full responsibility for 
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5-6.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. at 6.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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the site failed, KBA filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, 
recovery of response costs, compensatory damages, and attorneys
fees under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act,182 the Minnesota Environmental 
Response and Liability Act,183 the Minnesota Environmental Rights 
Act,184 and under theories of nuisance, negligence, and strict
liability.185
After discovery had closed, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
decided Jensen v. Walsh.186  At that time, KBA moved the court for 
leave to amend its complaint to add a claim of punitive damages 
based on the change in Minnesota law.  The court granted the 
motion and allowed limited discovery on the issue of punitive 
damages, through which KBA obtained additional information on 
Westinghouse’s knowledge regarding both the risks of PCBs and 
the near certainty of PCB contamination at the site prior to its sale.
This evidence, along with evidence of Viacom’s financial status, was 
presented to the jury during a trial in federal court in Minneapolis 
that began in late January 2002.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002) (“CERCLA”).  A party is liable for
declaratory relief and for recovery of  “response costs” under CERCLA if it is a 
“responsible person” (i.e., the current or prior owner of a facility contaminated 
with hazardous substances arranged for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous 
substance or transported a hazardous substance), there is a release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from a facility, and the response costs incurred 
are consistent with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605,
9607(a) (2002).
183. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01-.175 (2002) (“MERLA”).  MERLA, the Minnesota
counterpart to CERCLA, contains very similar liability provisions to CERCLA 
except that current owners are only “responsible persons” if they themselves 
“generate[d], stor[ed], transport[ed], treat[ed] or dispose[d] of a hazardous 
substance at the facility, . . . knowingly permitted others [to do so], . . . or took 
action which significantly contributed to the release after [knowing of the
presence of the] hazardous substance.” See § 115B.03, subd. 3.
184. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (2002) (“MERA”).  MERA provides for
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the pollution, impairment, or
destruction of natural resources in the state. Id.  “‘Natural resources’” include “all 
mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil quietude, recreational and 
historic resources.”  § 116B.02, subd. 4. 
185. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 1.
186. 623 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Minn. 2001) (overruling Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622 
v. Keene Corp., 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1996)) (holding that plaintiff may seek 
punitive damages to property where damage was to property alone).
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E. Trial, Verdict, and Judgment
After two weeks of testimony that elicited the facts set forth in 
the previous sections, the jury found that Viacom was 100 percent 
liable under MERLA and 95 percent liable under CERCLA for the 
PCB contamination at the site.187  The jury also found Viacom liable 
under MERA and strictly liable for the contamination at the site.188
The jury awarded $106,393.23 in response costs under CERCLA 
and MERLA, $225,000 in compensatory damages based on
diminution in value to property, and $5 million in punitive
damages.189
On May 31, 2002, the district court issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in the case.190  In its Judgment, 
the court adopted the jury’s conclusions in all respects, but instead 
of finding Viacom 95 percent liable under CERCLA, it found 
Viacom 100 percent liable under CERCLA and declared that 
Viacom was liable for all future response costs under both CERCLA 
and MERLA.191  With regard to the MERA claim, the district court 
held that KBA had prevailed on that claim under Minnesota
Statutes section 116B.07, and affirmatively enjoined Viacom to 
remediate the site’s soil, groundwater, and building interior so that 
the previously placed deed restriction could be removed.192  As for 
the damages, the district court found there was “sufficient evidence 
adduced at trial” to support the jury’s findings on KBA’s common 
law claims, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.193
Finally, the district court held that KBA was entitled to recover 
prejudgment interest, costs, disbursements, and attorneys fees 
incurred in the case.194
187. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 7-8.
188. Id. at 8-9.
189. Id. at 9.
190. Because the CERCLA, MERLA, and MERA claims are all considered 
equitable claims, the jury’s verdict on those claims was advisory only, and the court 
was required to issue its own findings on those claims. Id. at 7.
191. Id. at 7-10.
192. Id. at 8-9.
193. Id. at 9.
194. Id. at 10.  Unlike CERCLA, which does not allow for the recovery of 
attorneys fees incurred in pursuing a lawsuit (see Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 
511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994)), MERLA specifically allows for the recovery of “costs, 
disbursements and reasonable attorneys fees and witness fees” to the prevailing 
party. MINN. STAT. § 115B.14 (2002).  In an order dated Feb. 4, 2003, the district
court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge 
awarding KBA $1,113,915.00 in attorney fees, expert witness fees and costs, and 
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F. Lessons Learned
The Kennedy Building Associates case is a textbook example of 
the impact of the Jensen decision in environmental cases.  Prior to 
Jensen, deliberate concealment in Minnesota of environmental
harms in the past posed little risk of significant exposure from 
private lawsuits.  At the start of the Kennedy Building Associates case, 
Westinghouse’s past misconduct was relevant only for purposes of 
establishing simple liability on the claims themselves but had little 
to no relevance in the damages phase of the case.  As a result of 
Jensen, however, Westinghouse’s knowledge of the risks of
contamination and deliberate disregard of those risks played a 
significant role in all aspects of the case, including damages.195  In 
doing so, punitive damages served their purpose—to punish bad 
behavior and deter similar misconduct in the future.
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MINNESOTA: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE
The punitive damages landscape in Minnesota has changed 
significantly since Jensen.196  By abandoning the personal injury 
requirement, the Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed the 
number and types of cases where punitive damages may be
available to increase substantially.  For instance, because so many 
environmental contamination cases result solely in damage to
property (toxic tort cases are the obvious exception to this rule),
parties faced with defending such lawsuits generally have not had 
any need to factor punitive damages into their risk calculations.  By 
the same token, parties seeking to recover for property damages 
caused by environmental contamination often are forced to face 
the reality that the cost of bringing a civil lawsuit to trial will cost 
more than the amount necessary to remediate the property.
The Jensen case, as demonstrated in Kennedy Building Associates 
v. Viacom, changes this equation dramatically in environmental and 
other property damage cases in Minnesota.  When the case began, 
KBA’s maximum recovery was limited to recovery of response costs, 
damages for diminution in property value, and costs and attorneys 
fees under MERLA.  Although these amounts were not
$41,677.89 in prejudgment interest. See Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. 
(D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2002) and slip op. (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2003).
195. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., No. 99-1833, slip op. at 7-8.
196. 623 N.W.2d  247 (Minn. 2001). 
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insubstantial, the case, as a matter of law, could do no more than 
return to KBA some of the costs and damages that had been 
incurred as a result of Westinghouse’s contamination of the site.
Once Jensen was decided, however, these same injuries took on 
a new significance—creating significant additional financial value 
to KBA and significant additional risk to Viacom.  Even beyond 
these implications for the parties, the case may deter others who 
might deliberately ignore or conceal contamination in the future 
or fail to live up to obligations imposed by contamination they 
caused in the past.  Now that the damages may take into account 
the financial status of the defendant (which, in Viacom’s case, was 
substantial), defendants have additional incentives to take
responsibility for past contamination before a lawsuit is brought 
because losing the case means more than being faced with an order 
to work with the state environmental agency to remediate the site.
While reasonable people will continue to disagree over the types of 
cases in which punitive damages should be awarded, there can no 
longer be any disagreement that punitive damages will need to be 
part of the risk equation in environmental and other property 
damage cases arising in the State of Minnesota.
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